We establish four facts concerning competition among U.S. generic drug suppliers, using IQVIA's National Sales Perspective™ 2004Q4 -2016Q3 data. We define a unique product market ("molform"), consisting of the combination of a molecule active ingredient and a route of administration formulation, aggregated over different dosages and strengths. We find: (i) supply exhibits substantial churning in entrants and exits; (ii) volume-weighted use concentrates in older generic molform cohorts; (iii) the extent of competition is greatest for the oldest molform cohorts and is smallest for the youngest molform cohorts. With a median of one competitor, the extent of competition in the youngest molform cohort is very limited; and (iv) supplier-molform annual revenues are typically small, are largest for relatively young drugs, but are heavily right skewed. These four facts provide an empirical platform on which to construct and empirically evaluate hypotheses regarding generic drug market structure, performance, and possible policy reforms.
INTRODUCTION
Off-patent 'generic' prescription drugs are a dominant component of the United States' medicinal armamentarium. In 2017, 90 percent of retail and mail order prescriptions in the United States (U.S.) were dispensed as generic drugs, and for those molecules for which a generic was available, the generic penetration rate was 97 percent (M. L. Aitken and Kleinrock 2018) . Vigorous demand for generic products is buttressed by state laws and regulations requiring generic substitution when available, with limited exceptions.
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires manufacturers to obtain approval to market a drug. On-patent 'branded' prescription drugs are marketed under the pioneer's FDA approved New Drug Application (NDA) that specifies its chemical composition, safety and efficacy in treating disease, and manufacturing procedures to comply with good manufacturing practices. Generic competition with a branded drug occurs after the branded product has lost patent or market exclusivity. FDA approval of a generic manufacturer's Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) requires its sponsor to establish pharmaceutical and bioequivalence to the brand and compliance with good manufacturing practices; establishing safety and efficacy of the generic is not required. Thus, once generics are approved and certified by the FDA, competition among them, and between them and the brand, primarily involves price and assured availability and only minimally entails quality.
Observed differences between generic and brand pricing are a function of several factors. First, the development process of generic drugs is generally less costly than for the brand.
Generic manufacturers also exploit technological developments and cost efficiency improvements since the original product was approved, enabling the generic manufacturer to attain lower variable production costs. Consequently, generics are frequently considered to be a commodity-type product with low marginal costs.
Second, like all consumer products, the number of unique competitors marketing a product affects its price. A substantial existing literature documents the marginal impact of additional numbers of generic entrants on generic price in the 24 months following initial loss of exclusivity (LOE) in largely orally formulated branded drugs (Berndt and Aitken 2011; Berndt and Newhouse 2012) . Other research finds the extent of generic entry in the 24 months after LOE is in large part determined by pre-LOE sales volume (higher sales volume pre-LOE is associated with more entry post-LOE) and by product formulation (less entry among non-orally formulated drugs compared to oral formulations) (Conti and Berndt 2014) .
However, despite the very robust competitive entry and price competition exhibited by commonly used drugs in the 24 months post-LOE, not all post-LOE pioneer drugs face competition from generic competitors. Post-LOE entry by generic competitors may be frustrated or forestalled by the brand through various "pay for delay" agreements, or by successful line extension launches by the brand manufacturer (Drake, Starr, and McGuire 2015; McGuire et al. 2016; Drake and McGuire 2016) . Various recent reports have raised questions regarding the adequacy of supplier competition in mature generic drug markets years after initial LOE. Government investigations have focused on factors associated with drug shortages involving largely old, injectible generic drugs (Conti and Berndt 2014; Collins and McCaskill 2016) and relatively rare, but highly visible, high prices and dramatic price increases (Collins and McCaskill 2016; Alpern, Stauffer, and Kesselheim 2014) involving generic drugs facing little if any market competition (Conti and Berndt 2014; Alpern, Stauffer, and Kesselheim 2014; Silverman 2014) . Former Commissioner Gottlieb has interpreted the role of the FDA to include ensuring competition over generic drugs' lifecycle (U.S. Few studies have examined empirical levels and trends in the extent of generic drug supply. In this paper, we quantify competition in U.S. generic product markets using national sales prescription drug data. We are particularly interested in understanding the nature of mature competition among generic drug products in the later years following initial LOE to assess whether the intense competition observed immediately following LOE is sustained over time. Our goal is to provide an empirical platform on which to construct and empirically evaluate causal hypotheses and inform ongoing policy discussions (Dave et al. 2017 ). 1
II. EMPIRICAL APPROACH
Using national prescription drug sales and supplier data, we quantify and report statistics addressing the following questions: (i) How extensive is supplier churning (entry and exit) in branded and generic markets?; (ii) How old are the generic drugs commonly used by American consumers?; (iii) How many competitors does a typical generic product face and how does this vary by vintage?; (iv) How large are annual manufacturer revenues per generic product market, and how does this vary by vintage? And (v) How do these relationships change over time and differ by generic product formulation?
Using commercially available data from IQVIA (formerly IMS Health and QuintilesIMS) National Sales Perspective™ (NSP) database, 2004Q4 -2016Q3, we examine the universe of prescription drugs sold nationwide (Berndt, Conti, and Murphy 2017) . NSP data derive from a projected audit of purchases from manufacturers or wholesalers to pharmacies, clinics, hospitals and other distribution outlets, covering 100 percent of the national unit volume in all major classes of trade and distribution channels. The data provides information on each prescription drug by specific chemical and brand name, formulation and name of the drug's labeler (FDA's terminology for the holder of the drug's NDA or ANDA) which we interpret here as the name of a given drug's manufacturer. 2 The branded status of a drug is a variable assigned by NSP quarterly to account for loss of patent exclusivity and generic entry over time. NSP includes 'branded' drugs -those on some patent or other exclusivity and sold by only one manufacturer -and 'generic' or 'biosimilar' drugs -those with LOE and sold by one or more manufacturers. NSP distinguishes between 'oral', 'injectible' and 'other' product formulations. 'Other' products include drugs formulated as topicals and inhalants.
We define product markets at the molecule-formulation level, "molform". This product market definition takes a molecule (e.g., atorvastatin) and aggregates up over the various strengths of its dosage forms (e.g., over 10, 20, 40 and 80 mg strengths of an oral tablet). Different forms of a molecule (e.g., injectibles and oral tablets) constitute different 'molforms' and consequently different product markets. This definition implies that different manufacturers selling the same molform are competing in the same product market. It also implies different manufacturers selling different molecules that are used for the same or similar clinical purpose are not competing in the same product market. For example, the various oral tablet dosage strengths of the statin drug rosuvastatin (brand name Crestor™) used to treat LDL-cholesterol are in a different product market than the various oral tablet dosage strengths of the statin drug atorvastatin (brand name Lipitor™) also used to treat LDL-cholesterol.
Consequently, in our empirical framework, product markets are assumed to exhibit significant within market cross-price substitutability but limited between market cross-price substitutability. This definition generally conforms to product market definitions adopted by the FTC in enforcing its horizontal merger guidelines jointly developed with the DOJ (Whinston 2007) . However, it is important to note that this economic price-substitutability defined market definition may not conform to product market conceptions used in clinical practice. For example, the statin drugs rosuvastatin and atorvastatin might be considered by some physicians as being clinically substitutable, although our approach deems them to be in separate product markets.
Additional details regarding variable definitions and analyses
NSP defines a drug as being "generic" at the quarter-year the branded molform loses patent or other exclusivity. The data vendor's assignment of 'generic' to a molform does not imply that the product faces intra-molform competition from another manufacturer. There are two types of manufacturers marketing 'generic' molforms in our sample: manufacturers marketing the molform under the branded manufacturer's FDA approved NDA and ANDA. NSP designates the former 'branded'. Branded drugs are marketed either by the originator branded manufacturer or through a license to another manufacturer (e.g., Pfizer holds the NDA to market the molform Epipen TM and Pfizer has licensed to Mylan the right to market Epipen TM . Mylan is the sole manufacturer of Epipen TM in our sample). The latter are commonly termed in the gray literature and in legal proceedings as 'authorized generics' (Berndt et al. 2007) . NSP also designates a branded drug with LOE and facing same-molecule generic competition as a "branded generic" drug. 'Branded generics' include molforms that are slight reformulations of the originator product or combine the originator molecule with another already generic molecule(s) under the originator's NDA (so-called supplemental NDA). In our empirical framework, we enumerate brands, branded generics and generics available post-LOE in our manufacturer count of a given product market and alternative estimates of within product market size. Branded generics and generics are both considered 'generics' in our analysis.
Our principal metrics for analyses are: (1) the number of unique manufacturers of a molform in a quarter-year; (2) the market size of a molform proxied by its quarterly and annual number of standard units sales volume and its inflation-adjusted sales revenues; and (3) two other product characteristics -the quarter and year of its original U.S. launch date (we term this drug 'vintage') (Lichtenberg 2009 ), and the product market's formulation which we interpret as a measure of its manufacturer's fixed and variable costs of production.
As a measure of sales volume, NSP reports "standard units" measuring the number of smallest dosage form single items (such as vials, syringes, bottles of tablets/capsules) contained in a unit or shipping package purchased by pharmacies or other distribution outlets. These units are 'standardized' to approximate per prescription volume comparisons between orally formulated and non-orally formulated drugs. Although "standard unit" is an inherently ambiguous metric, we are unaware of any better or more commonly utilized metric of drug product volume sold nation-wide (Berndt and Dubois 2016) .
The "dollar sales" reported by NSP is the total amounts paid for purchases of a molform from a specific manufacturer by quarter, converted into 2016Q1 U.S. dollars using the Gross Domestic Implicit Price Deflator, indexed to 1.000 in 2016Q1
("Federal Reserve Board Economic Data" 2018). The invoice-based dollar metrics reflect the amounts paid by retail pharmacies, hospitals and clinics, whether purchased directly from a manufacturer or indirectly via a wholesaler or chain warehouse.
Invoice line item discounts are included, but prompt-payment, bottom-line invoice and 340B discounts are excluded (Dusetzina et al. 2017; M. Aitken et al. 2016 ). Drug rebates paid by the manufacturer to an insurer or intermediary are not reflected in these invoiced revenues and are generally not publicly available. To the extent sales from wholesalers include wholesaler margins and exclude off-invoice rebates paid by manufacturers to pharmaceutical benefit managers (PBMs), third party payers, pharmacies and insurers, the NSP data overstate net revenues received by manufacturers. NSP contains two variables denoting "manufacturers", "Corp" and "Mnf". "Corp" is the alphanumeric name of the corporation, including its subsidiaries, identified on the sponsor-owned-FDAapproved label appearing in the Orange Book (the NDA or ANDA applicant), while "Mnf" is the product's manufacturer, such as the "parent" corporation of a multi-corporation firm. Here we employ "Mnf" as the principal identity of generic drug supplier, although we also undertake sensitivity analyses utilizing "Corp". Our results are not materially different using "Corp" rather than "Mnf".
For each generic molform quarterly observation, we count the number of unique Mnfs having positive unit volumes during that quarter. We measure competition in each molform by the number of distinct manufacturers having positive sales volumes in that quarter. The number of competitors includes the branded or branded generic manufacturer for the molform when available.
We consider an entry to occur in the first period in which the Mnf makes a positive sale in the respective molform market, following at least one quarter of zero sales. Similarly, we consider an exit to occur at the last quarter year in which the Mnf makes a positive sale in the molform market, followed by one or more quarters of zero sales. When calculating quarterly entry and exit rates in quarter t, we define the denominator as the count of Mnfs in quarter t-1 aggregated over all molform-
Mnfs.
Market shares measured in standard unit volumes are similarly defined by molform. We aggregate standard unit volumes for each molform-manufacturer pair and for each molform.
Molform-Mnf sales measured in standard unit volumes are then expressed as a fraction of total molform sales at time t.
Shares are defined between 0 and 100 where the max value is 100.
Product market vintage is also defined by molform. This definition presents some challenges as drug launches occur at a molecule-dose-formulation level, yet we observe product markets at the molform level. Consequently, a product market may have multiple launch dates. To address this concern, we define the vintage of a product market as the earliest reported U.S. launch date for a given molform. This launch date is a variable reported by the data vendor, and corresponds to the year of the molform's launch into the U.S. market as a branded drug. This assignment rule worked well for the vast majority of product markets, 81.5% of the sample, where for the same molform a generic and a brand were observed in the dataset. For the remaining 18.5% of the sample, where no brand product was observed in the dataset or where the brand had a launch date that followed the generic, a manual search of the FDA's Orange Book revealed that in most cases these products were very old drugs (approved in the 1950s or earlier) or combinations involving very old drugs. For these molforms absent further information, we faced the choice of identifying the product molform launch date as the earliest of (i) the launch date of the generic recorded in NSP ('Option 1'), or (ii) the launch date of the brand even if NSP indicated the launch date of the brand occurred after that of the generic ('Option 2'). In operationalizing these options, we found Option 1 always entails a greater age than Option 2, with the size of the age difference being small and stable. We chose to use Option 2 for the main analysis. In sensitivity analyses, we used the Option 1 definition of product market vintage and reran all analyses.
There were no material differences in results.
We identify five vintages among molform drug markets and assign each molform to one of five vintage cohorts in each year: 
III. RESULTS

Sample Descriptive Statistics
INSERT FIGURE 1
With these drug characteristics as background, we now present four facts involving more disaggregated statistics on the sample.
FACT 1: Branded and Generic Drug Products Exhibit Substantial Churning (Entry and Exit)
Manufacturer entry and exit in drug markets is robust, particularly among generics. Table 2 displays quarterly exit and entry rates separately for branded and generic product markets. The numbers in the cells are percentages and each percentage point corresponds to about 60-70 absolute quarterly entrants or exits. On average, entry rates are about 3 percent for generics, 1 percent for brands, and for exit rates, about 2 percent for generics and 1 percent for brands. Entry rates in both branded and generic product markets are greater than exit rates and increase over time, but recently entry rates have fallen and exit rates have increased.
INSERT TABLE 2
Greater entry/exit upheaval and churning appears to occur in generic compared to branded drug markets. Specifically, total quarterly churn (entry plus exit) rates are non-trivial and exhibit relative stability at about 4 to 5 percent, but the entry vs. exit composition differs between branded and generic Any observed entry breaks in Table 2 occur between 2011 and 2013, coinciding with the "patent cliff" in 2011-2012 as a large number of "blockbuster" drugs lost patent and other exclusivities, and implementation of Generic Drug User Fee Amendment Acts (GDUFA-I) in 2013 (Berndt, Conti, and Murphy 2018) . While the difference between brand and generic entry rates is much smaller in 2016 than earlier, the difference in brand and generic exit rates is observed to increase substantially beginning around 2011. 
INSERT FIGURE 2
The volume share of the youngest generic product markets is not only the smallest of the five vintage cohorts, it appears to In summary, newly genericized drug products have not been that successful in penetrating U.S. generic markets. This is in rather marked contrast to the older cohorts of generic drug whose U.S. volume shares have grown quite steadily over time.
Finally, as seen in Appendix Figure A1 these vintage trends in volume shares observed over all formulations are similar to those occurring for orally formulated molforms. In contrast, the oldest cohorts among the injectible and especially the other molforms do not increasingly dominate volume shares, but instead it is the second oldest and middle age vintage cohorts among these formulated generic drug products that increase in volume share over time. The youngest cohorts (< 15 years) fare the poorest in garnering volume market share overall and across each of the product formulations.
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FACT 3: Competition in Generic Molform Markets is Typically
Limited and is More Robust Among Older Compared to Younger
Product Markets
We calculate the mean and interquartile range of number of manufacturers by molform vintage cohort, and display these calculated values in Table 3 .
INSERT TABLE 3
As measured by means (Table 3) and 20-24 year cohorts reaches between 5 and 6, with at 6 the 20-24 year cohort facing almost as many competitors as the oldest (35+ years) cohort.
In each time period, median values for each vintage cohort are generally smaller than their corresponding mean values.
However, we do observe some differences across vintage cohorts.
The median number of manufacturers in the oldest vintage cohort, at between 4 and 6, is only slightly smaller than the corresponding mean number of manufacturers which range from above 6 to almost 8. In contrast, for the youngest vintage cohort (< 15 years), the median number of manufacturers is 1 throughout the 2004-2016 time period, while the mean number of competitor manufacturers is relatively stable at about 2 -twice the median value. Hence the ratio of mean to median is largest for the youngest vintage, and smallest for the oldest vintage, with the other vintages having mean/median ratios in between.
In summary, the extent of competition is greatest for the oldest cohorts of drugs (35+ years) and is smallest for the youngest cohort (< 15 years). Indeed, with a median of but 1 competitor, for the youngest cohort the extent of competition is very limited.
To evaluate whether this characterization of competition also holds for each molform formulation, in Appendix Table A1 we report the annualized mean and interquartile range of 
INSERT TABLE 4
More striking is that in every year mean revenues per molform-Mnf are at least several times larger than even at the 75 th percentile, indicating that sales revenues per molform-Mnf are extremely right-skewed. In the early years, annual mean sales revenues were about 2.3 to 2.8 times larger than at the 75 th percentile, and even as the 75 th percentile level of sales increased sharply in 2011-2013, so too did the mean, which by 2016 was just over $15 million annually.
Again in all three product formulations, sales revenues per molecule-manufacturer are highly right-skewed, with the difference between mean and median being the largest in the other formulation. In all years, injectible generic drug product markets exhibit larger median, mean and 75 Th percentile annual sales revenue per manufacturer compared to oral and other formulated drugs. In summary, the aggregate trends in sales revenue per molecule-manufacturer appear to be driven largely by orals and injectibles. 
INSERT TABLE 5
A striking finding is that while for all vintages except the youngest, the ratio of mean annual revenues to median annual revenues, evaluated at the average over all years, ranges between 12 and 17, indicating substantial skewness. However, for the youngest cohort -those < 15 years -this mean/median ratio reaches an astonishing value of about 30. Thus, it is in the youngest vintage of generic drugs where the dispersion in annual revenues is relatively largest -a very few recent vintage generic drugs are extremely successful, but most are not. Indeed, as seen in Table 5 , for the youngest vintage, median annual revenues have fallen by over 50% between 2004 and 2016, from $875,000 to $371,000. In contrast, for the oldest vintage, between 2004 and 2016 median annual revenues have grown four-fold -from $351,000 to $1.44 million.
In terms of mean annual revenues, for the three oldest Hence, all generic drug vintage cohorts exhibit substantial right skewness, and a small number of very successful generic molforms make mean revenues look much more attractive than median values. However, it is the younger generic drug market vintages that display the most enormous heterogeneity in annual revenue streams. In general but especially in recent years, older generic vintage drugs have experienced greater revenue growth than have the younger vintages.
IV. DISCUSSION
The four descriptive facts about U.S generic product markets we report in this study raise several issues important for further empirical evaluation and policy discussion. These findings contrast sharply with evidence presented by previous studies suggesting generic competition is significant, commonly involving four or more suppliers in the first 24 months after loss of patent protection and other exclusivities (Berndt and Aitken 2011; Berndt and Newhouse 2012) . The research findings reported here are also generally consistent with recently published research based on selected claims data encompassing a more limited set of generic drug markets (Dave et al. 2017) .
Over the last few years policy makers and the FDA have raised concerns regarding the adequacy of competition among selected generic drug markets. These discussions have led to the FDA implementing policies to encourage more competition whenever the number of generic competitors is less than three (U.S. Food and Drug Administration 2017). Our findings suggest increased FDA scrutiny over markets with limited competition may be a larger task than commonly appreciated.
Third, we find that the revenues received for a small number of generic drug products by their manufacturers appears to have been much larger than for most generic products. The occurrence of this phenomenon in the last decade suggests the possibility that relatively high revenue generic drugs might concentrate among those awarded 180-day exclusivity from successful patent challenges and thus face no or only an "authorized" generic competitor. Certain older products enjoying high revenues might be those with no competitors, slight reformulations of older pioneer products that confer some advantages to consumers or prescribers, or those benefiting from price increases during shortages due to temporary exits for which demand still exists. (Berndt, Conti, and Murphy 2017) .
Lastly, an intriguing issue raised here relates market competition to drug price increases. Previous research has reported high and growing prices among selected generic drugs, related to a limited number of manufacturers (Collins and McCaskill 2016; Alpern, Stauffer, and Kesselheim 2014; Silverman 2014) . Given the limited and possibly declining generic molecule competition we observe generally, why have prices for generic drugs not risen more rapidly than has been observed?
Two hypotheses come to mind. First, the increased consolidation in recent years from merger and acquisition activity involving wholesaler purchasers, retail chains, insurers and PBM firms may have increased demand side buying power, putting downward pressure on generic manufacturers' prices. By exercising this increased monopsonistic buying power and combining it with PBMs' powerful utilization management tools, purchasers may increasingly be able to play generic manufacturers off against each other, intensifying generic price competition.
Second, it may be that many generic molecule markets are contestable, whereby firms hold an option to enter or re-enter.
In contestable markets, the threat of entry disciplines incumbent firms, resulting in pricing outcomes that resemble highly competitive, multi-manufacturer markets, even when the number of actual competitors is small. 4 Once a generic manufacturer receives an approved ANDA, it can retain it indefinitely even if it temporarily discontinues producing the product. The threat of reentry by temporary exiting firms might facilitate contestability. This possibility and the role of the Generic Drug User Fee legislation in 2013 and 2017 in affecting temporary or permanent exit merit more research.
In summary, U.S. generic molecule markets typically experience substantial entry and exit "churn" rates, generating surprisingly modest annual revenues (although in recent years a small number of molform markets have earned substantial revenue streams). The median number of generic manufacturers in molform markets is between 2 and 3 indicating that U.S. generic molecule markets are highly concentrated and that manufacturers typically face very limited competition. Although much recent attention has been placed on generic entry and use patterns among newer generic drugs, the most commonly used generic drug products are older drugs, many of which launched in the 1990s 'blockbuster' era. The research findings reported here suggest that dynamic patterns of entry, exit, and revenues achieved by generic prescription drugs in U.S. markets are complex, vary by vintage, and are worthy of further scrutiny.
Notes 1 These authors use MarketScan™ retrospective claims data to examine prices and market competition for drugs classified as either single or multi-source between 2008-2013, excluding entry and exit of new brands, and entry of generics following the brand's loss of exclusivity between 2008-2013. The data contain retail and mail order pharmacy claims, but likely understate sales through long term care, hospital, and federal facility channels.
2 The FDA's Orange Book identifies the ANDA applicant, noting the actual manufacturer may differ from the ANDA applicant (also called labeler) due to manufacturing outsourcing to contract manufacturers. The ANDA applicant may differ from the marketer, due to licensing actions. Our use of the term "supplier" should therefore be interpreted as the entity selling and marketing a molecule dosage form.
3 Based on manufacturer-supplied data reported to the FDA, Berndt ER, Conti RM, Murphy SJ, 2018, op. cit., find that the number of net active pharmaceutical ingredient and final dosage form manufacturing facilities has declined between 2013 and 2017. 
